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Abstract – It is our goal within this project to develop a 
powerful electronic system capable to claim, with high 
certainty, that a malicious software is running (or not) 
along with the workstations’ normal activity. The new 
product will be based on measurement of the supply 
current taken by a workstation from the grid.  Unique 
technique is proposed within these proceedings that 
analyses the supply current to produce information about 
the state of the workstation and to generate information of 
the presence of malicious software running along with the 
rightful applications. The testing is based on comparison of 
the behavior of a fault-free workstation (established in 
advance) and the behavior of the potentially faulty device. 
Keywords – monitoring, malicious software, supply 
current. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
These proceedings are based on advanced analysis of 
power supply current to the Device Under Test (DUT) with 
the aim of detecting malicious activity. The method stems 
from the long term research in the fields of electronic 
design, testing, diagnosis, statistical analysis, and artificial 
neural networks application within the Laboratory for 
Electronic Circuit Design Automation at the University of 
Nis.  
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Hibernation 217.5 0.090 5.29 18.4 1.04 -19.3 19.6 3.3 
Standby 218.7 0.093 12.4 32.2 2.53 -19.3 20.4 6.0 
Idle 217.8 0.339 88.5 16.4 65.4 -31.9 73.9 12.6 
High load 
 (Video) 218.0 0.348 89.1 16.2 67.7 -32.3 76.0 12.1 
High load 
(Simulation) 217.6 0.537 95.0 13.0 111. -32.1 117. 18.3 
As part of the research task to characterize the personal 
computer as an energy consumer [1],  Table 1. was 
reported. 
The above measurements were obtained for a desktop 
computer (DELL Optiplex 980, Intel Core i7 CPU @ 
2.8GHz, 4GB RAM, 500GB HDD). Characterization 
variables above are as follows: the RMS value of the line 
voltage (V), the RMS value of the line current (I), the total 
power factor (TPF), the total harmonic distortion of the 
current (THDI),  the active power (P), the reactive power 
(QB), the apparent power (U), and the distortion power 
(D). Several states of activity were considered: 
Hibernation, Standby, Idle, High load (Video), and High 
load (Simulation). 
Table 1 demonstrates that the internal activity of the 
computer can be deduced from power characterization. 
Particularly interesting aspect is harmonic distortion here 
represented by the THDI. Namely, the computer, like most 
electronic loads to the grid, is nonlinear. That means it 
distorts the grid current from its original sinusoidal 
waveform i.e. creates harmonic being measurable from the 
grid side. The current waveform, as may be partly deduced 
from Table 1, depends on the activities within the computer 
and so are the harmonics. That suggests that by 
measurement of the current waveform one may try to 
identify malicious activities.  
Similar methods are applied in IDDQ testing and 
diagnosis of CMOS electronics [2]. Here, every event in a 
CMOS digital system introduces a very short pulse into the 
DC supply current of the circuit. These pulses aggregate to 
form the DC current (IDD), imprinting information about 
all activities in the system to the supply current.  
Findings in [1] and [2], suggest a correspondence 
between the activity within the device and the measured 
cha racteristics of the supply current. Our proposal is to 
develop a technique for utilizing this correspondence to 
perform comparisons between a vetted device, which will 
be stated in the next as the DUT, and a standard fault free 
device. 
The analysis process can be described as a sequence of 
following steps: 
1. Measurement 
2. Creation of time series “strings” 
3. Spectrum computation 
4. Comparisons – similarity evaluation 
5. Proposing a hypothesis 
The following sections describe the proposed system in 
more detail. 
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II. THE MEASUREMENT SUBSYSTEM 
 
The physical structure of the Vetting by Supply Current 
Monitoring (VbCM) system we are proposing here is 
depicted in Fig. 1. It is connected to the power grid via the 
acquisition module (AC), and transfers power directly to 
the DUT (load) while sampling the values of the current 
and voltage waveforms passing through. The sampled 
values are appropriately conditioned and coded, and then 
directly delivered to the testing computer (TC) via USB or 
Wi-Fi connection. The software implemented in the TC 
performs all computations. TC is used as a visualization 
device, enabling display of the measured and derived 
waveforms; as an interactive monitor allowing monitoring 
and control of the chara-terization process; as a data 
storage device creating measurement logs and databases; 
and as a communication means enabling remote control of 
the measurement and on-line delivery of the results. 
Grid
 220 rms
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(Acquisition module)
Power
inlet
Power
outlet
Signal
output
Power inlet
TC 
(Test computer)
DUT (Device
under test)
USB/WiFi  input
 
Fig 1. Physical structure of the VbCM system (The 220 Vrms is 
related to European standards) 
The acquisition module is performing acquisition and 
conditioning of the electrical signals. The module for signal 
conditioning of the voltage and current waveforms provide 
attenuation, isolation, and antialiasing. 
In the present three-phase application the acquisition is 
performed by National Instruments cDAQ-9714 expansion 
chassis, providing hot-plug module connectivity.  The 
chassis is equipped with two data acquisition modules: 
NI9225 and NI9227. Extension chassis is connected to TC 
running virtual instrument via USB interface. NI9225 has 
three channels of simultaneously sampled voltage inputs 
with 24-bit accuracy, 50 kSa/s per channel sampling rate, 
and 600 VRMS channel-to-earth isolation, suitable for 
voltage measurements up to 100th harmonic (5 kHz). The 
300 VRMS range enables line-to-neutral measurements of 
110V or 240 V power grids. NI9227 is four channels input 
module with 24-bit accuracy, 50 kSa/s per channel 
sampling rate, designed to measure 5 ARMS nominal and 
up to 14 A peak on each channel with 250 VRMS channel-
to-channel isolation. The virtual instrument is realized in 
National Instruments LabVIEW developing package which 
provides simple creation of virtual instruments. Virtual 
instruments consist of interface to acquisition module and 
application with graphic user interface.  
 
III. CREATION OF TIME SERIES 
 
In this stage, the signal obtained after testing is 
converted to time series. There are three scenarios for 
obtaining samples: 
• Boot sequence 
• Idle state 
• Application execution 
During the measurement phase of the test, time series is 
obtained for selected device activity as above. For example, 
in Table 1. five states are established among which three 
are with no application running while the last two 
excessively load the processor and the video card. The 
choice of a number of test runs and application is subject to 
further analysis.  
Further research task is establishing the length of data 
strings and how many strings will be required for every 
state of the DUT. It is our experience that for getting the 
spectrum of the current by the Goertzel algorithm, 200 ms 
(for the 50 Hz case) are sufficient. The strings measured for 
the given set of states of the fault-free device are sufficient 
for its characterization since stationary conditions are 
established and no change in time may be expected. 
However, length of testing of the potentially ‘faulty’ device 
is also subject to further research. 
 
IV. Comparisons - similarity evaluation 
 
From our experience in time series prediction [3,4], 
classification [5] and diagnosis [6,7,8], the subject of 
comparison of the responses of the fault-free and the 
potentially faulty DUT will be an important research issue 
within this project.  
According to [9], there are several measures of 
similarity of time series that may be used concurrently. For 
example, the correlation coefficient may be calculated as: 
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where Ip is the first series, Iq is the second series,  and  , 
are mean values, and N is the number of samples. To 
demonstrate we made new measurements, similar to the 
ones depicted in Table 1, some results of which will be 
presented here. The DELL Optiplex 980 run under 
Windows 7 Professional was considered in the following 
states:  1. Off : meaning the computer was switched off; 2. 
Idle: Only the operating system is running (65 processes 
and 975 threads were active during the measurement while 
0% of the CPU was utilized); 3. Video: 4 MPEG4 video 
streams were activated simultaneously while 4%-8% of the 
processor was loaded; 4. CPU Arithmetic: Synthetic 
DhrystoneiSSE4.2 and Wetstone iSSE3 Benchmark test 
were activated with 100% of the CPU loading; 5. Multi-
Media CPU:  Synthetic Multi-MediaInt x16 iSSE4.4, Float 
X8 iSSE2 iDouble x4 iSSE2 were activated with 100% of 
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the CPU loading; 6. GPU Rendering: renderbenchmark test 
were activated to test the Graphic processor: 
NativeFloatShaders, EmulatedDouble-Shaders; 7. Physical 
Disks: test for evaluation of the disc performances were 
activated: Physical disk benchmark WDC5000AAKS-
007AA0; 8. File System Benchmark: Performances test for 
the I/O file system was activated. 
TABLE II 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE SIGNALS OBTAINED FOR DIFFERENT STATES OF THE WORKSTATION 
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Off  1               
Idle -0,92574 1             
Video 0,287788 -0,01358 1           
CPU Arithmetic -0,96037 0,857545 -0,49706 1         
GPU Rendering -0,90384 0,986579 0,079612 0,811307 1       
Multi-Media CPU 0,867432 -0,97951 -0,13936 -0,7647 -0,99222 1     
Physical Disks -0,60827 0,798615 0,528475 0,422196 0,862064 -0,88421 1   
File System Benchmark 0,785238 -0,59354 0,771507 -0,91172 -0,52713 0,458711 -0,05733 1 
 
Strings of 10,000 samples (200 ms or 10 periods), were 
taken at the rate of 20 μs. After implementation of  (1) the 
correlation matrix given in Table 2 was obtained. While 
these results may be used for some further analysis (for 
example, high correlation coefficient means that the same 
resources were (equally) active during the run of two 
particular software packages.) they are introduced here 
only to demonstrate what is expected to be done with the 
measurement results when comparing the behavior of the 
fault-free and the DUT. 
In the tables that will be used for testing, while the rows 
indicating the states will be kept as above, the columns will 
be related to the strings displaced in time obtained by 
repetitive measurements of the same state. Accordingly, the 
table will be a matrix albeit not a symmetric one. Search 
will be performed for the cases with smallest correlation 
coefficients, which indicate difference in the behavior of 
the DUT and fault-free device. 
 
V. COMPARISONS - SPECTRUM COMPUTATION 
 
Additionally, analysis will be performed in spectral 
domain, for each time series string. The transformation 
almost entirely preserves the information content of the 
string while reducing the data size. To do that, because of 
the instability of the frequency of the grid, the frequency is 
to be extracted first [10]. Then, an algorithm is to be 
implemented for Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) that is 
resistant to the instability of the period of the signal. The 
Goertzel algorithm [11] will then be applied. 
Approximately 50 harmonics may be observed in a 
sample (string) of a grid current. We expect approximately 
10 strings per device to be created for every state of the 
device, one of them stored for the fault-free device, to be 
used as a base for comparisons. 
For the measurement of a fault-free device analyzed in 
Table 2 appropriate DFT was performed. The spectral 
components obtained are presented in Table 3. Since even 
harmonics have incomparably smaller values than the odd 
ones, in Table 3 only the DC, the main, and the odd 
harmonics are presented. Figure 2 illustrates two columns 
of Table 3. 
While these results may be used for some further 
analysis we are delivering them here as a kind of proof-of-
concept since not the same value of any harmonic may be 
found while similarities may be extracted. 
 
 VI. CREATING THE MOST PROBABLE HYPOTHESIS 
 
The testing will be implemented in the following way.  
First, for the fault free device, one string of the supply 
current will be created after steady state for every test 
program. We will denote the strings here as Si, i=1,2,..., n. 
n is the number of software packages developed for testing 
purposes. At the very moment we are not sure as to what 
value of n will be necessary. 
Then, for every installed malicious software, after 
equilibrium, m strings of supply current will be taken, se-
parated by a fixed time interval, for all n testing soft-ware 
packages. We will denote these strings by Qi,j, i= 1,2,...,n, 
and j=1,2,..., m. 
Accordingly, there will be nΗm strings generated from 
the DUT for every malicious attack.   
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TABLE III 
ODD HARMONICS EXTRACTED FROM ONE STRING MEASUREMENT IN EIGHT DIFFERENT STATES OF THE WORKSTATION 
Harm.  No. DC 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 
Off  -
0.55 89.7 3.05 8.55 8.94 3.08 8.76 2.77 6.28 4.81 0.69 0.92 0.62 
Idle -
0.84 400.26 47.9 23.18 11.41 9.19 6.17 1.4 9.81 3.66 4.16 7.39 5.17 
Video 1.3 475.4 54.03 23.52 12.3 7.7 7.24 1.73 12.19 5.1 5.05 6.52 7.15 
CPU Arithmetic -
0.52 785.73 34.6 28.7 17.43 10.12 12.27 6.01 5.98 8.91 5.74 4.89 6.06 
GPU Rendering -
0.68 747.73 35.84 28.42 16.77 9.26 11.13 5.81 6.84 9.9 5.68 5.12 7.19 
Multi-Media CPU -1.3 394.33 47.79 22.83 9.74 9.17 6.12 1.99 9.32 5.6 3.3 6.65 5.55 
Physical Disks -
0.23 381.54 48.05 23.53 6.96 8.63 5.36 2.49 9.94 3.76 5.75 5.55 4.56 
File System 
Benchmark 
-
0.51 411.72 47.73 24.14 9.61 9.5 5.53 2.96 8.92 3.71 7.31 5.29 4.3 
Harm.  No. 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 
Off  0.53 0.94 0.62 0.54 1.08 0.47 0.45 0.58 0.54 0.24 0.27 0.39 0.21 
Idle 4.12 5.18 6.61 4.89 7.58 3.98 2.61 3.9 1.29 1.28 1.91 0.94 0.36 
Video 6.2 8.31 6.35 3.64 5.23 2.72 2.09 2.83 0.97 0.46 0.85 0.98 0.53 
CPU Arithmetic 5.86 2.29 2.94 2.54 4.48 1.71 0.51 2.94 1.26 1.24 1.44 0.34 1.95 
GPU Rendering 4.63 1.28 4.3 3.61 3.67 1.59 0.93 3.55 0.56 0.67 1.79 0.48 1.78 
Multi-Media CPU 4.6 4.2 5.85 4.98 7.84 4.27 2.98 3.97 1.54 1.39 2.2 0.55 0.7 
Physical Disks 5.2 3.07 4.93 3.96 8.2 4.17 3.19 4.7 0.96 1.24 1.93 0.9 1.34 
File System 
Benchmark 4.76 6.35 6.26 5.16 7.34 2.94 2.2 2.81 1.11 1.82 1.77 1.03 0.95 
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Fig 2. Measured odd harmonics in two cases: Physical disc drive 
active and CPU loaded by arithmetic computations. The first 
harmonic is omitted for convenience 
Comparisons will be done within the i-th set Qi,j, 
j=1,2,..., m in order to find whether a change happens in 
time e.g. if there exists Qi,k≠ Qi,l. Here ≠  means not 
similar, while k,l J={1,2,..,m}. If yes, a probability exist for 
the malicious attack was activated by the i-th testing 
software. The chosen Qi,j will be compared with Si to get 
final decision. If similar, i will be incremented by one and 
the procedure will be repeated.  
If none of the strings goes below the chosen similarity 
measure the conclusion will be that no malicious software 
is running.  
In the next, here we will demonstrate that there are 
some potentially feasible procedures to measure similarity. 
What we are presenting here is not a solution but a hint of 
why we will use these mathematical tools. 
Suppose the correlation matrix is used as a basis for de-
cision about the similarity between the responses of the 
fault-free and the faulty device. Since at least ten strings 
per state will be produced a correlation coefficient will be 
calculated for every string of the fault-free and the DUT for 
a given state. That is important since no time 
synchronization is preserved for the two measurements. 
It is obvious that a proper search is to be done to find: 
(1) the most distant (less correlated) strings within a state 
and (2) the most distant strings of all. That would become 
the most probable hypothesis if the correlation coefficient 
is used as the basis for establishing the non-similarity of the 
behavior of the faulty and fault-free device. A threshold is 
to be foreseen in order to enable conclusion as to whether 
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the extracted minimal similarity may be pronounced a 
proof for the presence of malicious activity within the 
device. In that way the testing process may be terminated 
by a go-no-go statement. 
TABLE VI 
RESPONSES OF THE ANN TO NOISY INPUT DATA 
ANN’s Output→ 
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-1 
0.94189 -0.0082643 -4.98E-05 0.0596502 0.0054563 -2.69E-05 0.0025452 0.0012835 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-2 
-0.100789 0.936809 -6.30E-05 0.107029 -0.0039056 -4.57E-05 0.0353001 0.0301201 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-3 
0.0747284 -0.0347075 1.00742 -0.0946782 0.0368009 6.60E-06 0.0172143 -0.0095049 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
-4 
0.0530374 -0.0051336 -3.01E-05 0.94394 0.00599 4.07E-06 -0.0031459 0.0039932 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
-5 
-0.0714551 0.141341 0.0002496 0.347383 0.694706 2.93E-05 -0.0165517 -0.0935344 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
-6 
-0.0390391 -0.068559 -2.64E-05 0.0464038 -0.0182126 0.994595 0.0357881 0.0513166 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
-7 
0.0221675 -0.0245939 -7.76E-06 -0.0287134 0.0235965 -8.00E-07 1.01758 -0.010466 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
-8 
0.0524894 -0.0178626 -6.26E-05 -0.0587603 0.0177179 1.40E-06 0.0010393 1.00386 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
Note, the information about the state that produces 
minimal similarity, in some way, may be used as a 
diagnostic information since it identifies the state of the 
device where the malicious activity happens.  
Other statistical measures of similarity will be not 
excluded from analysis 
On the other side, if the harmonic spectrum is to be 
used for extracting the nonsimilarity measure, a proper 
method of hypothesis generation will be created. 
For example, an ANN was trained to create a response 
recognizing which one of the sets of harmonics of Table 3 
is present at its input. Its structure is depicted in Fig. 3. To 
simplify, for the proper vector of harmonics, the 
corresponding output of the ANN was forced to unity while 
the rest of the outputs were kept at zero. In other words, it 
was trained to recognize which software was running 
within the computer. Full success was achieved meaning, 
after training, the ANN was classifying perfectly. 
To make the problem harder, we transformed Table 3 
so that every entry was recalculated by the formula 
]025.0)12(1[new ⋅−⋅+⋅= rndxx  (3) 
where rnd is a pseudo-random number with uniform 
distribution within the [0,1] segment. In other words a 
“noise” of amplitude (peak-to-peak) as large as 5% of the 
harmonic value was added as “measurement disturbance”. 
Again, as can be seen from Table 4, excellent classification 
was obtained.  
Off 
Fully 
connected 
feed-forward 
ANN
Physical Disks
Multi-Media CPU
GPU Rendering
CPU Arithmetic
Video
Idle
File System Benchmark
DC
Harmonic No. 1
Harmonic No. 3
.
.
.
Harmonic No. 47
Harmonic No. 49
Fig 3. Artificial neural network that eavesdrops the personal 
computer based on information on harmonics in its mains current 
 
Finally, eight new sets of “harmonics” were created 
artificially by permutations within the rows in Table 3 and 
the newly created columns were used as excitation to the 
ANN. None succeeded to deceive the ANN. 
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At the very moment we are not aware as to which of the 
concepts will be the best to be applied for detecting 
malicious activities in a computer. There is a probability 
for several of them to be used simultaneously i.e to apply 
Multiple Criteria Assessment of Discrete Alternatives 
(MCDA) [12]. That would lead to a creation of an integral 
measure of nonsimilarity while giving weight to different 
outcomes from different approaches (correlation of time 
series, correlation of harmonics, pattern recognition by 
ANNs, etc). 
 
VII. DESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEM 
 
The analysis system consists of the measurement 
subsystem and the software subsystem. 
Given a fault-free device, measurements are performed to 
produce strings of supply current. There will be several 
states analyzed. The resulting data will be stored on the TC. 
For testing a DUT, same measurements are repeated 
several times. Obtained time series strings are used by the 
software subsystem to reach a decision.The software within 
TC will enable interactive user-friendly interface with the 
test engineer. It will also allow for logging, documenting, 
reporting, storing, and post-processing of the resulting data. 
 
VIII. UNIQUE PROPERTIES OF THE SOLUTION 
 
There are several aspects of our solution that we believe 
are novel and unique.  
1. It is noninvasive. No change whatsoever happens in the 
software and hardware of the device.  
2.  The testing does not interfere with the regular activities 
of the device and therefore testing could potentially be 
performed on an active production device (e.g. network 
router). 
3. The measurements, the measurement results, and the 
processing are taking place outside of the device so no 
tempering with the test from within the device is 
possible. 
4. No library (or lists) of malware is to be produced and 
updated. 
5. The simplicity of the concept will allow for 
improvements that are not conceivable at the moment. 
6. The solution is entirely independent of device classes, 
CPU architectures, operating systems etc. 
While the proposed solution consists of activities that 
are known in the testing practice of electronic systems, the 
uniqueness comes from the fact that these ideas were never 
utilized and tuned for detection of malicious activities in 
electronic devices. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
[1] Nieto, O., et all., “Energy Profile of a Personal 
Computer”, Proceedings of the LVI Conf. of 
ETRAN, Zlatibor, Serbia, June 2012, ISBN 978-
86-80509-67-9, Paper EL3.3-1-4.  
[2] Hurst, S. L., “VLSI testing: digital and mixed 
analogue/digital techniques”, IEE, London, 1998, 
ISBN 0852969015. 
[3] Milojković, J., and Litovski, V., “Dynamic Short-
Term Forecasting of Electricity Load Using Feed-
Forward ANNs”,  Int. J. of Engineering Intelligent 
Systems for Electrical Engineering and 
Communications, 2009, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 39-48. 
[4] Milojković, J., and Litovski, V., “Short Term 
Forecasting in Electronics”,  Int. J. of Electronics, 
Vol. 98, No. 2, 2011, pp. 161-172. 
[5] Milenković, S., Obradović, Z., and Litovski, V., 
“Annealing Based Dynamic Learning in Second-
Order Neural Networks”, Int. Conf. on Neural 
Networks, ICNN '96, Washington, D.C., USA,  3.-
6. June 1996, pp. 458-463. 
[6] Litovski V., Andrejević M., and Zwolinski M., 
“Analogue Electronic Circuit Diagnosis Based on 
ANNs”, Microelectronics Reliability, Vol. 46, No. 
8, August 2006, pp. 1382-1391. 
[7] Andrejević-Stošović, M., Milovanović, D., and 
Litovski, V., “Hierarchical Approach to Diagnosis 
of Mixed-mode Circuits Using Artificial Neural 
Networks”, Neural Network World, Vol. 21, No. 
2, 2011, pp. 153-168. 
[8] Sokolović, M., Litovski, V., Zwolinski, M., “New 
Concepts of Worst Case Delay and Yield 
Estimation in Asynchronous VLSI Circuits”, 
Microelectronics Reliability, 2009, Vol. 49, No. 2, 
pp. 186-198. 
[9] Lhermitte, S., et all., “A comparison of time series 
similarity measures for classification and change 
detection of ecosystem dynamics”, Remote 
Sensing of Environment,  Vol. 115, No. 12, 15 
December 2011, pp. 3129–3152. 
[10] Terzija, V., Stanojević, V.: “STLS Algorithm for 
Power-Quality Indices Estimation”, IEEE 
Transactions on Power Delivery, April 2008, Vol. 
24, No. 2, pp. 544-552. 
[11] Goertzel, G., “An Algorithm for the Evaluation of 
Finite Trigonometric Series”, The American 
Mathematical Monthly, January 1958, No. 1, Vol. 
65, pp 34-35.  
[12] Makowski, M., and Granat, J., “ Multicriteria 
Analysis of Large Sets of Alternatives “, 21st 
CSM Workshop, IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria, 
August 27–29, 2007 
 
117 
 
